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1 Introduction 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) often operate a network of subsidiaries across coun-
tries. An average French multinational, for example, invests in 3.5 countries, with some of 
the largest such as Peugeot and Renault investing in more than a dozen. While theoretical 
economists have addressed this phenomenon and the cross-country interaction in multina-
tionals' location choices (see important contributions in this area by Motta and Norman, 
1996; Yeaple, 2003a; Ekholm, llikard and Markusen, 2007), most empirical analyses have 
assumed that a multinational firm's decision to invest in one foreign country is independent 
of its locations in other foreign countries.1 
This paper seeks to examine the interdependence in the multinational subsidiary net-
works and estimate two types of linkage between subsidiaries. First, the paper considers a 
horizontal linkage. Theoretical studies led by Markusen ( 1984) and Markusen and V enables 
(2000) have posited that in the presence of large trade costs and small plant-level scale econ-
omy firms are motivated to invest abroad and expand horizontally. This strategy has been 
referred to as the market-access or tariff-jumping motive in I\1NCs' investment decisions 
and suggests trade costs have a positive effect on FDI. The paper also considers a vertical 
linkage. The strand of theoretical literature led by Helpman (1984) has pointed out that 
firms whose production consists of several stages may find it more profitable to separate 
the production stages in various countries and locate each stage in a country \vhere the 
required production cost is lowest. This strategy has been referred to as the comparative-
advantage motive and is considered to lead to a vertical type of FDI. The role of trade 
costs is, however, reversed in this case relative to the case of horizontal FDI: Firms are 
more likely to locate their production in countries with low bilateral trade costs. Influen-
tial papers, such as Brainard (1997), Carr, Jvlarkusen and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003b), 
and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2005), have found evidence of both market-access and 
comparative-advantage motives in multinationals' investment activities. 
Let us now take a look at the geographic distribution of some of the largest French 
MNCs. Figure 1 plots Renault's production locations in the world. Two observations are 
noteworthy. First, Renault separates its production stages across countries. It produces 
components in countries such as Argentina, South Korea and Spain (indicated by the darker 
area of the figure) but performs the end processes in a larger set of countries (indicated by 
the sum of darker and lighter areas). Second, countries in which Renault only performs 
the end processes (indicated by the lighter area) are almost always geographically close to 
Renault's component production subsidiaries. A similar pattern is also found for Peugeot 
1 See below for a more elaborate discussion of the literature and the notable exceptions in the area 
including Head and 1.Jayer (2004), Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007), and Blonigen, Davies and et al. 
(forthcoming), which formally investigate third-country effects in multinationals' location decisions. 
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(Figure 2) and Essilor (Figure 3), two French lviNCs that specialize, respectively, in motor 
and lens products. 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
This paper seeks to explain the structure of these subsidiary networks. In particular, 
it asks: Given the existence of a subsidiary in one country, how likely will a firm invest in 
another market? Does this likelihood always increase with the trade costs of importing 
from the firm's existing subsidiaries? Is the effect of trade costs consistent with the theory 
of horizontal FDI or the theory of vertical FDI? To address these questions, the paper 
employs a dataset that reports detailed information on French manufacturing lviNCs' foreign 
subsidiaries. This dataset, by listing each included French MNC's suhsidiary location 
abroad and their respective primary products, identifies for each fixm and each country 
(i) the trade costs of importing (intermediate inputs or final product) from an existing 
subsidiary and (ii) the input-output relationship. The paper then applies a novel spatial 
autoregressive estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Kapoor, Kelejian 
and Prucha (2007) to estimate the interdependence in French lviNCs' subsidiary networks. 
This study is one of the first attempts to estimate intra-firm interdependence across 
space and, to my knowledge, the first to do so at individual subsidiary level. Past studies 
have mostly focused on the relationship between home and host production and treated 
firms' foreign activities as uncorrelated across host countries. The potential substituting or 
complementary relationship between a firm's foreign production locations has been largely 
ignored. The following few studies took the first step to estimate third-country effects in 
lviNCs' location decisions and are most relevant to this analysis. Specifically, Head and 
Mayer (2004) point out that third-country market demand can play a significant role in a 
country's ability to attract multinational firms. They find that Japanese multinationals 
are more likely to locate their production in regions proximate to large markets, a result 
that is consistent with the export-platform FDI theory modeled in Ekholm, Rikard and 
Markusen (2007). Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007) investigate a broader set of third-
country characteristics, including third countries' factor endowment, and find most of the 
characteristics affect the level of bilateral FDI. Blonigen, Davies and et al. (forthcoming) 
emphasize on the direct interdependence of FDI flows and find investments in third countries 
can have a negative effect on a host country's receipt of FDI. 
Similar to these studies, in particular, Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007) and Bloni-
gen, Davies and et al. (forthcoming), this paper uses a (albeit different) spatial econometric 
approach to examine the interaction of l\1NCs' location decisions across host countries. It, 
however: differs in three areas. First, in contrast with the analysis of Baltagi, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2007) and Blonigen, Davies and et al. (forthcoming) which uses either 
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country- or sector-level FDI data, this paper uses a subsidiary-level dataset that consists of 
individual MNCs' subsidiary information in the world. The use of this disaggregate data 
makes it possible to isolate intra-firm spatial interaction from other types of interaction, 
such as those between firms. It also allows the paper to obtain subsidiary specific informa-
tion and draw conclusive evidence on the significance of horizontal and vertical FDI, which 
has been largely missing in the literature. 
The paper also differs by introducing an input-output linkage between foreign produc-
tion locations. This is important as multinationals' location choices are likely to vary 
significantly with the nature of the relationship between subsidiaries. For subsidiaries with 
duplicate production, multination~ls have little incentive to locate them in countries where 
the trade costs of importing from one another are low_ For subsidiaries with complementary 
production processes, however, multinationals benefit from building the facilities in coun-
tries with geographic proximity and low bilateral tariffs. While the latter hypothesis has 
been tested with respect to the relationship between parent firms and foreign affiliates (see 
a recent contribution in this area by Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2005), it is largely 
ignored for the relationship between foreign affiliates. This paper takes into account the 
input-output linkage between MNCs' foreign production locations and allows the effect of 
trade costs to vary between substituting and complementary subsidiaries. 
Last, the existing studies have used distance as the main spatial weight of third-country 
effects. Two issues are associated with this approach. First, distance is not the only 
trade cost faced by multinationals. Tariffs imposed by a foreign country on each MNC are 
also expected to exert a similar and significant effect on multinationals' location decisions. 
Moreover, as discussed above the role of trade costs is different between horizontal and 
vertical FDI. It is therefore important to differentiate the cost of importing final products 
from the cost of importing intermediate inputs. These issues are addressed in this paper 
using information on the level of trade costs between each pair of subsidiaries. 
To proceed, I first build a theoretical framework where both the number and location of 
subsidiaries are endogenously determined. Based on this framework, I derive a structural 
spatial econometric model and estimate a firm's probability of investing in one country as 
a function of the characteristics of that country and the firm's existing subsidiaries. More 
specifically, I allow for two types of interdependence in the econometric model: (i) spatially 
lagged dependent variable and (ii) spatial autoregressive errors. Furthermore, in addi-
tion to distance - the spatial weighting matrix considered in the previous studies, I take 
into account three other factors: host-country tariff rates (on intermediate inputs and final 
goods), host-country differences in factor endowment, and input-output linkage between 
subsidiaries. If a multinational firm is driven by the :q1arket access motive and engages in 
horizontal FDI, its probability of investing in a country should increase with both the trans-
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port cost and the tariff of importing the final good from its existing subsidiaries. This is 
especially likely when countries are similar in factor endmvment. In the case of comparative 
advantage motive and vertical FDI, the multinational firm's incentive to invest in a country 
should decrease with the trade costs of importing intermediate inputs from upstream sub-
sidiaries especially when countries are complementary in comparative advantage and the 
input-output relationship between subsidiaries is close. The availability of subsidiary-level 
data allows me to obtain detailed information to test the above hypotheses. 
I find evidence of both horizontal and vertical interdependence between French multi-
nationals' foreign production locations. Specifically, I find that multinationals have little 
incentive to duplicate their production in countries that are proximate to one another. 
Similarly, they are less likely to invest in countries that set a low tariff on the firms' final-
good imports from existing subsidiaries. The effect of trade costs is, however, reversed for 
multinationals with vertical subsidiary networks. This type of multinationals tend to lo-
cate their vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with low bilateral trade costs, especially 
when there are also complementary comparative advantages. 
In the sensitivity analysis, I address the potential concern of unaccounted trade costs 
and consider alternative weighting matrices. In particular, I use the sectoral trade flow 
between each pair of host countries (in the MNC subsidiaries' primary product) as an 
alternative measure of between-subsidiary trade cost (or openness) and find it does not lead 
to any significant change in the results. I also control for unobserved host-country sectoral 
characteristics, such as market structure, and firm heterogeneities, such as product quality, 
with country-industry and firm fixed effects and find the results again remain qualitatively 
similar. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I adopt a three-country model 
in which firms' location decision is endogenously determined. Based on this model, I derive 
several testable hypotheses and a structural spatial econometric model. I then describe the 
econometric methodology in Section 3 along with the relevant data sources. In Section 4, I 
examine the distribution of French MNCs' subsidiaries and discuss its geographic attributes. 
I present the rnain econometric results and sensitivity analysis in Section 5 and conclude 
the paper in Section 6. 
2 The Model 
To motivate the empirical analysis, I build a model that is related to Motta and Norman 
(1996). Suppose the world consists of three countries, H, A and B. The representative 
consumer in each country allocates a certain amount of her expenditure, denoted as }j 
(j = H, A and B), to the industry of differentiated products. Within this industry, the 
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consumer has a utility function that exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES). 
Maximizing the CES utility function subject to the consumer's expenditure level yields the 
consumer demand function for each representative variety: qij = AJPi:{, where qij is the 
quantity of the differentiated product produced by firms in country i and sold to destination 
country j, Aj ::= Yj / 'L:r p;ja is the demand level in country j with r representing the set of 
varieties, Pii the price of this product, and a- the constant elasticity of substitution. Note 
that Pij = c/Jij ·Pi, where Pi is country i's product market price and 4>ij )" 1 is the iceberg 
trade cost of exporting from country i to country j (with </J;; = 1). 
For the purpose of this paper, the model assumes that country H's firms, denoted as 
h, can locate their production in any of the three countries while country A and B's firms 
produce only at home and serve the foreign markets via exports. The model also considers 
two types of production. First, it assumes that production consists of only one stage and 
firm h may potentially duplicate their production across countries and engage in horizontal 
FDI. Then, it considers the case in which production consists of two separable stages and 
firms may locate each stage in a different country and undertake vertical FDI. A structural 
estimation equation is derived at the end of the section and incorporates both of these 
possibilities. Let us now begin with the horizontal case. 
2.1 horizontal FDI 
When production consists of only one stage, firm h sets the profit-maximizing price at 
Pi= [cr/(u- l)]c;, where c; is the marginal cost of producing the differentiated good in 
country i. The quantity of the good produced in country i and sold to country j is therefore 
( 1) 
which indicates that the gross profit firm h earns by producing in country i and selling to 
destination country j is 
l-a"- -a A 




Note that 1rij is an increasing function of conntry j's demand (i.e., Aj) and a decreasing 
function of marginal production cost (i.e., c;) and trade cost (i.e., </J;1) 2 
Now denote di as firm h 1s location decision in country i, where i = H: A, and B; di = 1 
if firm h establishes a local production facility in country i and 0 otherwise. Because firm h 
can produce in more than one location, 2.:1 di ) 1. If di = 1 for i #- H, it means that firm 
2 Following the literature, the demand level, Aj, is exogenous from an individual firm's point of view. 
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h has a plant in country A or B and is considered as a multinational firm. For locations 
where d.; = 1, firm h also determines q;; for all j which includes the quantity it sells to 
local market (when j = i) and the quantity exported to foreign markets (when j I i and 
dj = 0).3 In addition to the variable cost of production, I assume each plant requires a 
fixed cost Fi. The total amount of fixed cost for firm h is therefore 2:i Fi · di. 
There is a total of 7 possible location configmations for firm h, denoted as [dH, dA, ds]. 
These possible configurations, assuming firm h produces in at least one location (i.e., 
maxi{di} > 0), can be divided to three categories: (1) 2:idi = 1, (2) 2:id; = 2, and 
(3) 2:; d; = 34 First, let us consider the case in which firm h only produces m one 
location i, i.e., d; = 1 and dj = 0 for all j I i. Its gross profit in this case is 
(3) 
By comparing equation (3) across all three potential locations, firm h chooses the location 
that maximizes the profit (if it decides to have only one plant). 
If firm h chooses to produce in two locations instead, say countries i and j (i.e., di = 
dj = 1), and export to the third country k (i.e., dk = 0) from country i, its gross profit is 
(4) 
Note the above equation assumes that ct-r:r cfika ): cJ-a c/Jj{, which ensures that firm h 
would export to k from i instead of j. To select the optimal pair of locations, firm h ranks 
the above profit function for each pair of countries and chooses the pair that yields the 
maximum. 
Firm h may also decide to produce in all three countries and supply each country 
through local production, i.e., di = 1 for all i. In this case, its gross profit becomes 
(5) 
;ll assume that firm h \vould supply a market from only one production location. If firm h has a plant 
in a country, it supplies this country's consumers through local production. If firm h does not have a plant 
in the country, it exports to this country from a location that maximizes its gross profit. 
-t This paper focuses on firm h 's location choices and supply strategies and hence assumes that the 
parameters of the model, such as the market size of each country, Yj, satisfy the nonnegative profit condition, 
that is, firm h would always supply each market. The decision faced by firm h is therefore to choose the 
optimal strategy to serve each market, i.e., local production versus exports, and the optimal production 
locations. 
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Given all the possible location choices above, firm h picks the optimal location config-
uration [d){, d:4, d'BJ that satisfies 
(6) 
where I1 (dH, dA, ds) is defined by equations (3), (4) and (5). The optimal number of 
plants is thus ~r d; ~ d){ + dA + d'B. 
Now without loss of generality let us consider firm h's decision to invest in country i given 
an existing plant in country j. Firm h would produce in both country i and country j if and 
only if IT(d; ~ 1,dj ~ 1) > IT(di ~O,dj ~ 1) and IT(di ~ 1,dj ~ 1) > IT(di ~ 1,dj ~o). 
Given equations (3) and (4), the necessary conditions for these inequalities to hold simul-
taneously are5 
( 1-a 1-a"- -a) A F Cj - ci 'hj j - er j > 
(7) 
0. 
which require Ci and Cj to be sufficiently similar and c/Jij and cf;ji to be sufficiently large. 
This result is consistent with the existing studies, which predict horizontal FDI is more 
likely to arise in countries with similar factor prices (or endowments) and large trade costs. 
Because of the symmetry, I focus here on the first condition. A sufficient condition for this 
inequality to hold is 
(8) 
This condition suggests that the likelihood of firm h investing in country i given an existing 
plant in country j is a decreasing function of Ci and Fi and an increasing function of Ai 
and <Pji· 
2.2 vertical FDI 
Now let us consider a two-stage production. Specifically, I assume that firm h must produce 
an intermediate input before manufacturing the final product-" Like the final product, the 
5 Because firm h may also have a plant in the third-country k and export to country i (and analogously 
country j) from there, (7) serves as necessary conditions. 
6 Given this paper's focus on intra-firm linkages, 1 do not consider here the option of purchasing inter-
mediate inputs from unaffiliated suppliers. The latter possibility and its role in firms' location decision is, 
however, an interesting reseach question in its own right and has a large scope for future empirical research. 
For seminal theoretical studies in this area, see, for example, Krugman and Venables (1996}, Venables 
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intermediate input can be produced in any of the three countries. This implies that firm 
h's location decision is now characterized as [uH, UA, UB, dH, dA, dB], which consists of the 
location choices for upstream and downstream production. For simplicity, I assume that 
the plant-level fixed cost required for the intermediate input, denoted as Gk, is sufficiently 
large such that firm h will only locate this stage of production in one country. I also assume 
that the upstream subsidiary will sell the inputs to the downstream subsidiaries at mkcPk;, 
where mk is the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input and cPki is the cost of 
exporting the intermediate input from country k to country i. 
As a result, the gross profit firm h earns by producing the intermediate input in country 
k and final good in country i and selling to destination country j is 
(9) 
Similar to the previous case, 'Trij is an increasing function of country j's demand (i.e., Aj) 
and a decreasing function of the final good marginal cost (i.e., c;) and the trade cost to 
ship the final good from country i to country j (i.e., q;ij)· However, because production 
now consists of more than one stage, 'iT ij is also a decreasing function of the marginal cost 
used to produce the intermediate input (i.e., mk) and the trade cost to ship the input to 
the final good production location (i.e., cPki)· 
·Now suppose that firms have chosen country k as the location to produce intennediate 
inputs. The total profit function will then be 
(10) 
if firm h decides to concentrate the second-stage production in one location, say i, or 
if firm h decides to locate the second stage in two countries, i and j, or 
IT (L cL,.~ 3, Uk ~ 1) ~ L (ci + m;cPki)l-a A;- L Fi- Gk 
r ' ' 
(12) 
(1996), and Puga and Venables (1997). The empirical analysis of this paper attempts to control for these 
factors using host-country-industry and firm fixed effects as firm-level data that identifies intermediate input 
suppliers is largely missing (Section 5.3). 
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if firm h produces the final good in all three countries. 
There are totally 21 possible location configurations. Firm h will choose the opti-
mal configuration, i.e., [uH,uA,uB,dH,dA,dB], that satisfies II(uH,uA,uB,dH,dA,d'B) ~ 
TI(uH,uA,us,dH, dA, ds), \1 [uH, uA, us, dH,dA,ds]. 
Now consider firm h's decision to produce the final good in country i given its upstream 
plant in country k 7 Here I assume firm h also produces final product in country k 8 Firm 
h would invest in country i only if 
(13) 
Denoting 1ki ~ ck/ci and p ~ mk/ck, the above inequality can be further transformed to 
Note when p = 0 (i.e., mk = 0), the above inequality is identical to inequality (7), the 
condition of horizontal expansion. A sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold 
IS 
It is not difficult to see that the role of trade costs is now twofold. On the one hand, it 
encourages firm h to expand its dovmstream production across countries as in the case of 
horizontal linkage (reflected in the term ln(1- </Jk;-1)). But on the other hand, it raises 
the cost of shipping intermediate inputs to downstream plants and discourages vertical FDI 
(reflected in the term (1-0") In (1 + fYYki<Pki) where 1- O" < 0). The latter effect is especially 
strong when (i) the input-output relationship captured in pis great and (ii) two countries' 
difference in cost structures captured in lki is large. 
To summarize, I incorporate the conditions specified m the horizontal and vertical 
linkage cases, i.e., (8) and (15), in the following estimation specification: 
7 The location of upstream plants is arguably also endogenously determined. Here I focus on the location 
choice of downstream plants because the location choice of upstream subsidiaries (such as R&D divison) is 
more likely to be driven by factors such as tJ1e availability of natural or human resources and firms have less 
incentive to duplicate this stage of production across countries. 
~This assumption is in alignment with annecdotal evidence including those presented in Figures 1-3. All 
the individually researched multinational firms, such as Renault, Peugeot and Essilor, are found to conduct 
some extent of final processing in upstream production locations but do not always perform intermediate-
input production in downstream production sites. 
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Pr(y; ~ 1lyj) ~<!>[a+ X;/3 + (,\Jinq\1; + >.2ln(1 + fYY)iq)ji)) · Y1 + c;] (16) 
where y; ~ 1 ifmax(u;,d;) ~ 1 and 0 ifmax(u;,d;) ~o, Pr(y; ~ 1lyj) is the probability 
of the firm investing in country i given its location decision in country j, <P(.) represents 
the cumulative probability function, X;{3 =o (3 1 1n e; + (32 1n A;+ (33 !n c; represents a vector 
of country i's characteristics, (,\1ln q)ji + -'2ln(1 + fYYjiq)ji)) · Yj captures the relationship 
between Yi and the firm's existing subsidiary captured by Yj, and Ei denotes the error term. 
In particular, I expect ,\1 > 0 in the presence of horizontal linkage and ,\2 < 0 in the 
presence of vertical linkage. 
3 Econometric framework 
3.1 Methodology 
To estimate equation (16), I adopt the following cross-sectional (first-order) spatial autore-
gressive model with (first-order) autoregressive disturbances: 
Yn Xn/3 + AJ WnYn + A2 VnYn + Un, 
pMnUn + E:n_. 
1-'1 < 1, 
IPI < 1. 
(17) 
In the above equations, Yn is an n X 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, 
Xn is an n X m matrix of observations on m exogenous variables, Wn, Vn and Mn are 
three n x n spatial weighting matrices, fJ is a m x 1 vector of parameters, ..\1 , >.2 and p 
are scalar autoregressive parameters, Un is an n X 1 vector of regression disturbances, E:n is 
an n x 1 vector of innovations. The variables WnYn, VnYn and Mnun are respectively the 
spatial lags of Yn and Un. For notational simplicity, I denote Zn ~ (Xn, WnYn, VnYn) and 
o ~ ((3, AJ, -'2)'. Applying a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to this model yields 
y~(p) ~ Z~(p)o +En, (18) 
where y~(p) ~ Yn- pMnYn and Z~(p) ~ Zn- pMnZn. 
I adopt the approach introduced in Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) to estimate the 
above model. This approach is more computationally feasible than the alternative es-
timator, i.e., the maximum likelihood estimator, especially in large samples where the 
latter estimator requires the weighting matrices to have simplifying features such as spare-
ness and symmetry. Given the weighting matrices used in this paper are relatively large 
(9, 717 X 9, 717) and do not always have features like symmetry (e.g., in the tariff weighting 
matrix discussed in the next section), I use the former method:-
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This method consists of three steps. First, I estimate equation (18) by a two-stage 
Least-Square estimator (2SLS). In particular, I estimate WnYn and VnYn using Xn and Hn 
and obtain: 
(19) 
where Zn (Xn, ~' ~) = PHnZn, WnYn = PHn WnYn, ~ = PHn VnYn, PHn = 
Hn(H~Hn)- 1 H~ and Hn is the matrix of instruments formed by a subset of linearly inde-
pendent columns of (Xn, WnXn, ~-V~Xn, VnXn, VJXn)· 
In the second step, I estimate the spatial autoregressive parameter p using the residua.ls 
obtained from the first step and the generalized moments procedure introduced in Kelejian 
and Prucha (1998). Specifically, the estimators of panda-;, i.e., p and er;, are defined as 
the nonlinear Least-Square estimators that minimize 
(20) 
where 
[ 2u~iln --::;:/--::;- ] ' [ ,, ' ] ' -UnUn n UnUn 1 ~ --::;:1--:::: Tr(M~Mn) 1 ~~~ Gn =- 2U~Un -Un1Ln 9n=- iinUn n ~ 
-::::1--:::: n U~tn+U~Un "' --:::: -UnUn n UnUn 
~ ' ~ 2' 
and Un = Muun and Un = Muun. 
In the third step, I estimate equation (18) using 2SLS and obtain 
(21) 
3.2 Spatial weighting matrices 
Now let us define the spatial weighting matrices that will be used to estimate the interde-
pendence of multinationals' locations. To proceed, I construct two N x N matrices, wh 
and vh, for each firm in the sample (where N denotes the number of countries in the data 
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and h denotes the firm). In particular, the cells in wh are defined as follows: 
w .. ~ { In <Phij for i yf j h,, 0" ... 
10T 't = J 
(22) 
Recall <Phij is the trade cost firm h faces when importing the final good from country i to 
country j. The cells in vh are defined as 
Vhij = J J J J { 
ln(1 +Ph ·"fh i<P'h·i) for Ph· > 0 
0 for Phj ~ 0 
(23) 
In this definition, Phj is the input-output coefficient between products produced in country 
j and final product, 'Yhji is countries' difference in production costs, and rf//':)1 is the trade 
cost of firm h importing its products produced in country j to country i. 
where wh = {whij}, vh = {vhij}, N represents the number of countries and K represents 
the number of firms. Last, I assume that the weighting matrix used to estimate the auto-
correlation in disturbances, Mn, is identical to Wn. 
3.3 Data description 
I employ a dataset of French manufacturing MNCs to estimate the determinants of multina-
tional subsidiary networks. This dataset is supplied by the AMADEUS, a comprehensive 
database that contains the financial and ownership information of public and private Eu-
ropean firms. AMADEUS is collected by information providers at each national official 
public body (e.g., Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle (National Institute for In-
dustrial Property) in the case of France) and has a particularly good coverage for countries 
including France, which partly motivated the use of French firms for this analysis. 
Before discussing explanatory variables, let us first define the dependent variable of 
this analysis, Yhi. Yhi is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm h has at least one 
subsidiary in country i at 2006 and 0 otherwise. I include all the countries that have 10 
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or more French MNC subsidiaries as potential hosts, resulting in a total of 41 countries,9 
and all the French multinationals that report financial and subsidiary data in AMADEUS 
and invest in at least one of the included countries. 
As discussed in Section 3, three subsidiary-level variables are used to construct the 
weighting matrices. These variables include (i) the distance between each pair of countries 
(as a proxy for transport cost), (ii) host-country tariff rates on firms' final product and 
goods produced in each subsidiary, and (iii) the input-output coefficient between the firm's 
final product and the subsidiary's primary good. The tariff data are taken from the 
WITS database and the input-output table is available from the INSEE. To capture host 
countries' differences in comparative advantage (an element of the weighting matrix defined 
in equation (23)), I follow the existing literature and use countries' differences in factor 
endowment measured by capital-labor ratio as a proxy.l0 
abundance ratio is described below. 
The construction of factor 
In addition to the spatial lag terms, conventional host-country characteristics are also 
included to explain firms' location choices. First, I use host countries' real gross domestic 
product measured in 2000 U.S. dollars as a proxy for market demand. Second, I include 
host countries' capital-labor ratio to control for their comparative advantage. A country's 
capital-labor ratio is the ratio of capital stock relative to the size of totallabor force, where 
the level of capital stock is constructed by using the perpetual inventory method outlined 
in Learner (1984) and assuming a depreciation rate of 7%. The data of GDP, investment 
and labor force are all taken from the i'Vorld Development Indicators. I also take into 
account host countries' tax: policy by including the maximum corporate tax: rate.l 1 This 
data is available from the U.S. Office of Tax Policy Research. Furthermore, I include the 
cost of starting business in each potential host country, a variable provided by the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators, as a proxy for the fixed cost of establishing foreign 
subsidiaries. 
I also follow the existing literature and separately account for the trade costs between 
France and host countries. 12 Specifically, I include the distance and the existence of 
a border between a potential host and France, host-country tariffs on France and French 
tariff rates on the hosts. Note, however, that the first two variables are also correlated with 
the fixed cost of investing in a foreign country (e.g., monitoring cost) and have therefore 
!I This criteria also helps to keep the weighting matrices within a computationally feasible size. 
10 ] also used countries' differences in sectoral unit labor costs to construct the weighting matrix. \Vhile 
the results were qualitatively similar, the sample size was reduced because of the missing values in the unit 
labor cost data. 
11 Ideally, I would like to use host countries' applied corporate tax rates. But such data consist of a large 
number of missing values for the countries included in the sample. 
12 An alternative is to treat France the same as any other country where French 1-INCs have subsidiaries 
and include it in the construction of spatial Jag terms. This was found not to change the results qualitatively. 
14 
an ambiguous effect on MNCs' location decision. All the tariff data used in the paper 
are applied sectoral tariff rates at the NACE 4-digit level and reflect the preferential trade 
relationships that pertain to the sample countries. The source of this data is the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. 
Finally, the paper takes into account two firm-level characteristics. First, motivated 
by the recent literature that relates firm productivity with the decision to invest in foreign 
countries (see, for example, Helpman et al., 2005), I control for each MNC's total factor 
productivity (TFP). Specifically, I use the financial data reported in the AMADEUS data-
base and the approach introduced in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to obtain estimates of 
TFP. According to Helpman et al. (2005), firms with a greater TFP are more likely to 
engage in FDI than their less efficient counterparts. I also include firms' labor intensity 
(i.e., the ratio of labor expenditure in value added) and expect firms with a higher labor 
intensity to have a greater likelihood to invest in labor-abundant countries. To test this 
prediction, I include labor intensity both independently and in an interaction term with 
host-country capital-labor ratio. The source and summary statistics of the above variables 
are provided in Table A.l. 
4 Geographic attributes of French MNC subsidiary networks 
Before tuming to the econometric analysis, let us first take a look at the geographic at-
tributes of French MNC subsidiary networks. As indicated by Figure 4, there is a large 
variation across French multinationals in the number of invested countries. The majority of 
French MNCs concentrate their foreign production activities in less than 3 countries while 
some spread to as many as 63. It is,· however, clear that the density of firms falls with the 
number of invested countries (for all firms that invest in at least two countries). 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Now what about the geographic density of subsidiaries? In Figure 5, I plot the level 
of distance between each pair of subsidiaries owned by the same French MNCs. As shown 
in the graph, the closest two subsidiaries is 66 kilometers apart (located in Austria and 
Slovakia) and the furthest is 19,845 kilometers (in Estonia and New Zealand). The majority 
of subsidiaries are less than 6,126 kilometers apart, while the average distance is about 6,000. 
Also notevmrthy in this graph is the shape of the density curve, in particular, the two humps 
at around 1,200 and 9,100 kilometers. This implies that a large percentage of French MNC 
subsidiaries are either clustered in neighboring countries (such as the EU members) or 
located relatively distant from each other. This is further confirmed in Figme 6 where the 
average subsidiary distance is calculated for each firm: While a significant fraction of French 
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MNCs have a dispersed subsidiary network, many of them concentrate their subsidiaries 
geographically. 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
Next, I examine the tariff level between subsidiaries. As shovvn in Figure 7, more than 
30 percent of subsidiary pairs do not have tariff between each other and more than 50 
percent have 7% or lower tariff rates. Figure 8 further shows that more than 15 percent 
of French MNCs locate their subsidiaries in countries where tariffs have been removed for 
each other and 50% percent face an average of 6% or lower tariff when exporting from one 
subsidiary to another. This seems to suggest that French MNCs are not always driven 
by the tariff-jumping motive when they choose their foreign production locations; a large 
percentage of them invest in countries where they can export to without paying tariff. 
[Figures 7 and 8 about here] 
So what motivates these multinationals to build a low-trade-cost subsidiary network? 
Is it the comparative-advantage motive which leads multinational fi.Tms to separate their 
production stages in countries with different comparative advantages and engage in intra-
firm trade between subsidiaries? To answer this question, I compare each subsidiary 
pair's difference in their countries' factor abundance, i.e., capital-labor ratio. I find, in 
Figure 9, that while a large number of subsidiary pairs are located in countries with similar 
comparative advantage - as one would expect for multinationals whose main motive to 
invest abroad is to avoid trade costs, more than 50 percent of subsidiaries are set up in 
countries whose difference in capital-labor ratio exceeds 127%. This result remains similar 
when I examine subsidiaries' average K/L difference at the firm level in Figure 10. While 30 
percent of French multinationals set up their subsidiaries in countries with 20% or smaller 
difference in factor abundance, there are also 30 percent of MNCs investing in countries 
whose capital-labor ratio difference exceeds 200%. 
[Figures 9 and 10 about here] 
I then repeat the above step for subsidiary pairs with relatively high trade costs and 
those whose trade cost, measured by either distance or tariff, is below average. The 
comparison is presented in Figures 11 and 12. I find, in Figure 11, that the density curve 
of K/L differential is shifted slightly rightward for subsidiaries that are relatively proximate 
to each other, suggesting a greater difference in these subsidiaries' comparative advantage. 
This pattern is similarly found when I compare high-tariff subsidiary pairs with those whose 
tariff is lower than average. Not only do the latter appear to have a greater K/L differential, 
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the difference is also more significantly pronounced. These results suggest that the role 
of trade cost in multinationals' location decisions can vary by firms' incentive to invest 
abroad and countries' complementarity in comparative advantage. While a greater trade 
cost can stimulate horizontal (or market-access driven) investment especially in countries 
with similar factor endowment, multinationals that seek to build a vertical production 
network and take advantage of countries' different comparative advantages may prefer a 
lower trade cost within their subsidiary network. 
[Figures 11 and 12 about here] 
5 Econometric results 
Let us now turn to the econometric analysis. I proceed by first estimating a conventional 
MNC location model without considering any spatial interdependence, i.e., assuming .\1, 
.\2 , and p of equation (17) all equal to 0. The results are largely consistent with the existing 
literature and are reported in Table 1.13 
[Table 1 about here] 
Firms are significantly more likely to invest in countries with a larger GDP. The distauce 
between France and a potential host adversely affects French MNCs' probability of investing 
in the foreign country, suggesting the role of distance in raising the fixed cost of investment. 
Entry cost, as expected from the theory, significantly deters MNCs from establishing a 
subsidiary in a foreign country. Tariffs set by the host country also affect French MNCs' 
decision to invest abroad as suggested by the tariff-jumping motive hypothesis: Firms are 
more likely to invest in countries where tariff rates are high. French tariff rates on the 
host country, however, reduce MNCs' probability of investing in the country, implying that 
some French multinationals supply their home consumers with production abroad. Firms' 
labor intensity is also significantly correlated with the probability of investing in foreign 
countries. Those with a higher labor intensity are more likely to produce overseas. The 
effect of TFP on firms' decision to invest abroad is also confirmed in the data and consistent 
with the literature. More productive French firms are more likely than their less efficient 
counterparts to set up foreign subsidiaries. 
Next let us examine the potential interdependence in multinationals' location choices. 
To do so, I estimate the (first-order) autoregressive spatial model outlined in equation (16) 
and (17). 
13 The Ho column in Table 1 (and the following tables) summarizes the hypotheses on the effect of ex-
planatory variables that are predicted by either the model or the literature. 
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5.1 horizontal interdependence 
I proceed by first focusing on horizontal linkage, i.e., estimating ,\1 and p and assuming 
,\2 = 0. Table 2 reports the estimates obtained from the last step of Kelejian and Prucha's 
procedure using distance as the spatial weighting matrix. This step itself consists of 
two stages. In the first stage, the spatially-lagged dependent variable WnY~ (i.e., MNCs' 
spatially-weighted number of subsidiaries in third countries) is estimated as a function of 
explanatory variables X~ and instrumental variables WnX~ and W~X~ (i.e., the spatially-
weighted third-country characteristics) 14 As suggested by the results in the left columns, 
most of the third-country variables exert a significant and expected effect on MNCs' location 
decisions. Multinationals are more likely to invest in third countries rather than a particular 
host when the third countries (i) have a larger market size, (ii) are more remote from France, 
(iii) require a smaller entry cost, (iv) impose a higher import tariff, and (v) are subject to 
a lower tariff when exporting to France. Labor-intensive multinationals are also more 
likely to have subsidiaries in labor-abundant countries (indicated by the parameter of the 
interaction term, K/L ratioxL intensity), a result that is predicted in the comparative-
advantage motive hypothesis. 
[Table 2 about here] 
I then obtain the fitted values of the spatially-lagged dependent variable w:y;; based 
on the first-stage estimates and estimate its effect on an MNC's decision to invest in a host 
country. As indicated by the parameter of w:;;;;, MNCs' probability of investing in a 
foreign country decreases with the proximity ·of their subsidiaries in third countries. This 
result is consistent with the theory of horizontal FDI in which multinationals' main motive 
to invest abroad is to avoid trade costs. The effect of other explanatory variables remains 
largely similar to the results in Table 1 while the overall performance of the estimation 
rises. 
I repeat the above estimations using the tariff rates between host countries (on MNCs' 
final product) to construct the weighting matrix. The results are reported in Table 3. 
As indicated by the parameter of w:y;; in the right panel of Table 3, multinationals' 
incentive to invest in a foreign country increases with that country's tariff rates on the 
firms' subsidiaries in third countries. 15 Put differently, firms are less likely to produce in a 
country where the tariff of importing from existing production locations is relatively low. 
14 Note that a Cochrane--Orcutt transformation has been applied to all the variables using the estimated 
spatial autoregressive parameter {5 obtained from the first and second steps of Kelejin and Prucha's proce-
dure. For example, y~ = Yn- P,.,NI,.,y,.,. 
15 First-stage estimates on one of the instrument vectors W,.,X,.,, however, become mostly insignificant 
when tariff is used to construct 1-'V,.,. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
5.2 vertical interdependence 
The evidence so far has indicated a significant horizontal interdependence between French 
MNCs' foreign subsidiaries. But is there any evidence of vertical interaction? To answer 
this question, I allow the effect of third-country subsidiaries to depend on not only trade 
costs but also countries' complementarity in comparative advantage and subsidiaries' input-
output linkage. Specifically, I estimate .\1, .\2, and p, the weights of spatial matrices 
defined in equation (16) and (17) by including the two spatial weighting matrices defined 
in equations (22) and (23), Wn and Vn. Table 4 reports the results. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Similar to Table 2, I find that an MNC's likelihood of investing in a foreign country 
falls when it has subsidiaries in proximity (indicated by the positive parameter of w:Y:. 
reported in the right panel of Table 4). However, at any given level of proximity, the 
probability increases with the country's difference in capital-labor ratio from the third-
country subsidiaries (indicated by the negative parameter of ~). It also increases with 
the input-output coefficient between subsidiaries (an element of the weighting matrix Vn), 
suggesting multinationals' incentive to reduce trade costs between vertically linked sub-
sidiaries, in particular, the trade costs of importing intermediate inputs from upstream 
production location. These results indicate that the geographic density of subsidiaries can 
vary significantly across multinationals and across countries: Market-access driven multi-
nationals tend to set up a dispersed subsidiary network whereas MNCs with separable 
production stages are likely to build a vertical production network in proximate countries. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The role of tariff between host countries also plays a similar role. As shown in Table 5, 
while multinationals are overall more likely to invest in countries that set a high tariff on 
the firms' existing subsidiaries, the effect is reversed for multinationals that seek to build 
a vertical production network. These multinationals are more likely to invest in countries 
that have a relatively low tariff on firms' upstream subsidiaries and are sufficiently different 
in capital-labor ratio. This is again consistent with multinationals' incentive to reduce the 
intra-network trade costs of transporting intermediate inputs. 
5.3 sensitivity analysis 
alternative weighting matrices 
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The above results have been obtained by using either distance or tariff as measures of 
trade cost. While transport cost and tariff are possibly the two most prominent forms of 
trade barriers, they do not capture all the trade costs faced by multinationals. I hence 
consider in this section an alternative measure in the construction of weighting matrices. 
Specifically, I use the level of trade flows as a proxy for host countries' openness toward one 
another. For example, for firm h and subsidiary pair i and j, I use the trade flow from 
country j to country i in firm h's primary product in country j as the proxy for country 
i's openness to country j. The trade flow data are obtained from COIVITRADE. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The third column of Table 6 reports the results based on this measure. The evidence 
indicates significant horizontal and vertical interdependence across subsidiaries. VVhile 
multinationals have less incentive to duplicate their production in countries with close 
bilateral trade relationships, they are motivated to locate their upstream and downstream 
productions in these countries if they have distinct comparative advantages. This tendency 
also increases with the input-output relationship between subsidiaries. 
omitted variables 
The empirical analysis so far has included conventional host-country and firm charac-
teristics in the estimations. The issue of omitted variables, however, can still arise. For ex-
ample, host countries' sectoral market structure in both the final-product and intermediate-
input industries can have a significant effect on multinationals' location decision. The latter 
information is especially important for firms that rely on unaffiliated upstream suppliers 
but is often unobservable for some countries and industries. Firm heterogeneities such 
as product quality can also affect multinationals' incentive to invest abroad and bias the 
estimated effect of other variables. But these data again are difficult to obtain. To address 
these concerns, I include in this section country-industry and firm fixed effects and check 
the robustness of the results. These fixed effects, by controlling for all the host-country sec-
tor a! characteristics and firm attributes, help me mitigate the influence of omitted variable 
and isolate the effect of spatial Jag terms. 
The results are summarized in the last column of Table 6. As shown, controlling for 
potential omitted variables does not qualitatively change the results. The estimated inter-
dependence in the French IVINC subsidiary networks remains largely similar and significant. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study is one of the first attempts to estimate the interdependence between multi-
nationals' foreign production locations. Using a detailed French multinationals dataset 
and a structural spatial econometric model, I find evidence of both horizontal and vertical 
linkages in French multinationals' subsidiary networks. The results indicate that while 
trade cost motivates multinationals to expand their subsidiary networks across countries, it 
discourages them from building a vertical production network. Firms are more inclined to 
locate vertically linked subsidiaries in countries where the cost of importing intermediate 
inputs is low and the comparative advantages are complementary. These results are also 
robust to the choice of weighting matrices in the spatial autoregressive model and control 
of unobserved host-country characteristics and firm heterogeneities. 
This paper conveys important policy implications with regard to the effect of regional 
economic integration on individual MNCs' location decision. A decline in trade costs 
between a North and a South country through, for example, the formation of a preferential 
trade agreement can raise firms' incentive to invest in both participating countries and set 
up vertically linked subsidiaries. Regional integration between North and North countries 
can also increase the FDI by outside multinationals - because of the improved market 
access within the region, but the effect is not uniform. Multinationals would have little 
incentive to have subsidiaries in both participating countries and would prefer instead to 
concentrate geographically. Countries with more favorable investment terms, in this case, 
would gain multinationals at the expense of their preferential trading partners. 
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Figure 1: Renault's subsidiary network (the darker area represents intermediate-input (and 
final-product) production locations; the lighter area represents final-product producation 
locations) 
Figure 2: Peugeot's subsidiary network (the darker area represents intermediate-input (and 
final-product) production locations; the lighter area represents final-product producation 
locations) 
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Figure 3: Essilor's subsidiary network (the darker area represents intermediate-input (and 
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Figure 4: The distribution of French multinational firms by the number of invested foreign 
countries (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 5: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the distance between subsidiaries 
(kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 6: The distribution of French MNCs by the average distance between subsidiaries 
(kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 7: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the tariff rate between sub-
sidiaries (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 8: The distribution of French MNCs by the average tariff rate between subsidiaries 
(kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 9: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by subsidiary countries' difference 
in capital-labor ratio (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
0 2 3 
ave_lnKL_diff 
4 5 
Figure 10: The distribution of French MNCs by subsidiary countries' average difference in 
capital-labor ratio (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve) 
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Figure 11: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by subsidiary countries' difference 
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Figure 12: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by subsidiary countries' difference 
in capital-labor ratio (a comparison of kernel density curve between high- and low-tariff 
subsidiary pairs) 
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Table 1: Estimating the location decision without spatial factors 




K/L ratioxL intensity 
corporate tax 
distance to home 
border + 
entry cost 
host country tariff + 
home country tariff 
firm labor intensity + 
firm tfp + 



















Note: (i) All variables except subsidiary, border and 
firm labor intensity are measured in natural logs; (ii) 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (iii) 
***,**and* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2: Spatial model: distance as the weighting matrix 
Stage 1 Ho coef. s.e. Stage 2 Ho coef. s.e. 
Dependent: W · subsidiarykc ?:;t:1:) Dependent: s1tbsidiaryki 
W· subsidiaryk(je'i) + 0.03** (0.01) 
W· GDP* + 0.06*** (0.00) GDP* + 0.09*** (0.00) 
W· K/L ratio* - 0.27*** (0.03) K/L ratio* - 0.04 (0.08) 
W (K/L ratioxL intensity)* - -0.26*** (0.03) K/L ratioxL intensity* - -0.06 (0.08) 
W · corporate tax* - 0.06*** (0.00) corporate tax* - 0.00 (0.01) 
W · distance to home* - -0.10*** (0.00) distance to home* - -0.05*** (0.01) 
W· border* + 0.17*** (0.00) border* + 0.18*** (0.01) 
lV · entry cost* -0.01 *** (0.00) entry cost* -0.01 * (0.00) 
W · host country tariff* + 0.02*** (0.00) host country tariff* + 0.01 *** (0.00) 
W · home country tariff* - -0.01 *** (0.00) home country tariff* -0.03*** (0.01) 
w W · L intensity* -0.62*** (0.05) L intensity* + 0.28*** (0.09) 
>-' W· tfp* -0.05*** (0.01) tfp* + 0.07*** (0.01) 
W2 · GDP* -0.01 *** (0.00) 
W2 · K/L ratio* -0.28*** (0.11) 
W 2 · (K/L ratioxL intensity)* 0.30*** (0.10) 
W 2 . corporate tax* 0.03*** (0.01) 
W 2· distance to home* 0.03*** (0.00) 
W 2· border* -0.01 (0.01) 
W 2· entry cost* 0.01 *** (0.00) 
W2 · host country tariff* -0.01 *** (0.00) 
W 2 · home country tariff* 0.01 (0.01) 
W 2 · L intensity* -0.10 (0.13) 
W 2 · tfp* 0.01 (0.02) 
second-stage controls yes 
No. of observations 9717 No. of observations 9717 
R square 0.76 R square 0.32 
Root MSE 0.18 Root MSE 0.36 
Note: (i) All variables except subsidiary, border and firm labor intensity are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors 
are reported in the parentheses; (iii) ***, **and* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 3: Spatial model: tariff as the weighting matrix 
Stage 1 Ho coef. s.e. Stage 2 Ho coef. s.e. 
Dependent: W· subsidiarykl#i) Dependent: subsidiaryki 
W· subsidiaryk(j,<i) + 0.01 ** (0.01) 
W· GDP* + 0.02 (0.02) GDP* - -0.09*** (0.00) 
W · K /L ratio* - 0.36 (1.67) K/L ratio* - 0.04 (0.08) 
W· (K/L ratioxL intensity)* - -0.43 (1.66) K/L ratioxL intensity* - -0.06 (0.08) 
l¥ · corporate tax* - 0.21 (0.22) corporate tax* - 0.00 (0.01) 
W · distance to home* -0.05 (0.06) distance to hmne* -0.04 *** (0.00) 
W· border* + 0.32 (0.28) border* + 0.19*** (0.01) 
W · entry cost* - 0.02 (0.07) entry cost* -0.01 * (0.00) 
W· host. country tariff* + -0.05 (0.04) host country tariff* + 0.01 *** (0.00) 
W · home country tariff* - 0.02 (0.04) home country tariff* -0.03*** (0.01) 
"' 
W · L intensity* 0.99 (1.04) L intensity* + 0.21 ** (0.12) 
"' W· tfp* 0.34*** (0.11) tfp* + 0.07*** (0.03) 
W2 · GDP* 0.00 (0.01) 
w 2. K/L ratio* 0.17*** (0.06) 
W 2 · (K/L ratioxL intensity)* 
W 2 - corporate tax* 0.08 (0.13) 
W2 . distance to home* 0.07*** (0.03) 
W 2 · border* -0.41 *** (0.17) 
W2 · entry cost* -0.19*** (0.05) 
w2. host country tariff* -0.00 (0.00) 
W2 . home country tariff* 0.00 (0.00) 
W 2 - L intensity* -1.87*** (0.67) 
W2· t.fp* -0.01 *** (0.00) 
second-stage controls yes 
No. of observations 9717 No. of observations 9717 
R square 0.79 R square 0.18 
Root MSE 0.17 Root MSE 0.34 
Note: (i) All variables except subsidiary, border and firm labor intensity are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors 
are reported in the parentheses; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4: Spatial model: distance and K/L difference as the weighting matrix 
Stage 1 system of simultaneous equations Stage 2 
Dependent variable: W·y~ V ·y~ Dependent: 
W (V)· subsidiaryzUii) Ho coef. s.e. coef. s.e. subsidiaryzi Ho coef. s.e. 
W · subsidiaryk(Jii) + 0.47*** (0.11) 
V· subsidiaryzuin - -0.42*** (0.07) 
W(V) GDP* + 0.09*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) GDP* + 0.10*** (0.00) 
W(V)· K/L ratio* 0.66 (0.56) -0.42 (0.47) K/L ratio* -0.02 (0.08) 
W(V)· (K/L ratioxL int.)* - -0.72 (0.55) 0.36 (0.46) K/L ratioxL intensity* - -0.02 (0.08) 
W(V)· corporate tax* 0.06 (0.07) 0.16 (0.12) corporate tax* 0.00 (0.01) 
W(V)· distance to home* - -0.24 *** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.04) distance to home* -0.04*** (0.01) 
W(V} border* + 0.19*** (0.07) 0.28*** (0.07) border* + 0.16*** (0.01) 
W(V)· entry cost* - -0.01 (0.01) -0.06*** (0.03) entry cost* -0.02*** (0.00) 
w W(V)· host. country tariff* + -0.01 (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) host country tariff* + 0.002 (0.00) w 
W(V)· home country tariff* - 0.03 (0.02) 0.03*** (0.01) home country tariff* -0.03*** (0.01) 
W(V)· L intensity* 0.58** (0.28) 0.52*** (0.20) L intensity* + 0.39*** (0.09) 
W(V)· tfp* 0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) tfp* + 0.07*** (0.01) 
W2(V2 )· GDP* -0.04*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.02) 
W2(V2 )· K/L ratio* -5.27*** (2.54) 2.24 (2.57) 
W2 (V2)· (K/L ratioxL int.)* 5.25* (2.52) -2.20 (2.54) 
W2 (V2 )· corporate tax* 0.75* (0.37) 0.21 (0.21) 
W2(V2 )· distance to home* 0.31 *** (0.07) 0.37*** (0.07) 
W2 (V2 )· border* 0.11 (0.15) 0.66*** (0.18) 
W2(V2 )· entry cost* -0.31 *** (0.07) -0.18*** (0.08) 
W2 (V2 )· host country tariff* -0.03*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 
W2(V2 )· home country tariff* 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
W2 (V2)· L intensity* 0.58 (0.52) -0.46 (0.52) 
W2(V2)· tfp* 0.02 (0.02) 0.04*** (0.01) 
second-stage controls yes yes 
No. of observations 9717 9717 No. of observations 9717 
R square 0.45 0.42 R square 0.21 
Root MSE 0.15 0.20 Root MSE 0.36 
Table 5: Spatial model: tariff and K/L difference as the weighting matrix 
Stage 1 system of simultaneous equations Stage 2 
Dependent: W·y~ V. y~ Dependent: 
W(V)· subsidiaryk(#i) Ho coef. s.e. coef. s.e. subsidiaryzi Ho coef. s.e. 
W· subsidiaryk(j,<i) + 0.03*** (0.00) 
V· subsidiaryk(#i) - -0.02*** (0.00) 
W(V)· GDP* + 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) GDP* + 0.09*** (0.00) 
W(V)· K/L ratio* - 2.04 (1.60) 2.44** (1.22) K/L ratio* - 0.08 (0.08) 
W(V)· (K/L ratioxL int.)* - -2.15 (1.59) -2.31 *** (1.19) K/L ratio x L intensity* -0.09 (0.08) 
W(V)· corporate tax* - 0.09 (0.21) -0.10 (0.14) corporate tax* - 0.00 (0.01) 
W (V)· distance to home* -0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) distance to home* -0.05*** (0.01) 
W (V)· border* + 0.09 (0.21) -0.07 (0.29) border* + 0.20*** (0.01) 
W(V)· entry cost* - -0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.04) entry cost* - -0.01 *** (0.00) 
w W (V)· host country tariff* + -0.01 (0.04) -0.005 (0.00) host country tariff* + 0.01 (0.00) 
"" W(V)· home country tariff* - -0.02 (0.04) -0.04*** (0.01) home country tariff* -0.02*** (0.01) 
W(V)· L intensity* 0.53 (0.98) -2. 78*** (0.56) L intensity* + 0.26 (0.12) 
W(V)· tfp* 0.32*** (0.09) -0.05*** (0.01) tfp* + 0.05** (0.02) 
W2(V2)· GDP* -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 *** (0.00) 
W2(V2)· K/L ratio* 0.18*** (0.15) 0.52*** (0.12) 
W2(V2) (K/L ratioxL int.)* -0.51 *** (0.12) 
W2(V2)· corporate tax* -0.28*** (0.10) -0.15*** (0.02) 
W2(V2)· distance to home* 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 *** (0.00) 
W2(V2)· border* -0.51 *** (0.14) -0.00 (0.02) 
W2(V2)· entry cost* -0.13*** (0.04) -0.01 * (0.00) 
W2(V2)· host country tariff* -0.00 (0.00) 0.001 *** (0.00) 
W2(V2)· home country tariff* 0.00 (0.00) -0.001 *** (0.00) 
W2 (V2) · L intensity* -1.88*** (0.55) -0.11 *** (0.02) 
W2(V2)· tfp* -0.01 *** (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00) 
second-stage controls yes yes 
No. of observations 9717 9717 No. of observations 9717 
R square 0.58 0.37 R square 0.18 
Root MSE 1.22 2.96 Root MSE 0.34 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis: alternative weighting matrices and control of omitted variables 
Stage 2 Ho coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Dependent: subsidiaryki 
W · subsidiaryz(jofi) + 0.001 *** (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00) 
V· subsidiaryk(jofi) -0.002*** (0.00) -0.003*** (0.00) 
GDP* + 0.09*** (0.00) 
K/L ratio* 0.17 (0.10) 
K/L ratioxL intensity* -0.20*** (0.10) -0.30*** (0.11) 
corporate tax* 0.01 (0.01) 
distance to home* -0.05*** (0.01) 
border* + 0.20*** (0.01) 
entry cost* -0.01 * (0.00) 
host country tariff* + 0.01 *** (0.00) 
home country tariff* -0.02*** (0.00) 
L intensity* + 0.31 *** (0.10) 
tfp* + 0.09*** (0.01) 
country-industry fixed effect No Yes 
firm fixed effect No Yes 
No. of observations 9717 9717 
R square 0.32 0.56 
Root MSE 0.37 0.22 
Note: (i) All variables except subsidiary, border and firm labor intensity are 
measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses; 
(iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A.1: Summary statistics 
Variables Source Mean Std. dev. M in lV!ax 
subsidiary Alv!ADEUS 0.19 0.39 0 1 
GDP WDI 26.24 1.35 23.85 30.00 
K/L ratio WDI 6.73 2.23 0.07 12.22 
corporate tax Office of Tax Policy Research -1.25 0.29 -2.40 -0.91 
w distance to home City Distance Calculator 7.81 1.19 5.57 9.73 
"' border - 0.14 0.35 0 1 
entry cost WDI 2.31 1.10 0 4.92 
host-country tariff COMTRADE 1.07 1.28 0 5.30 
home-country tariff COMTRADE 0.36 0.71 0 3.80 
firm labor intensity AMADEUS 0.63 0.19 0.01 0.99 
firm tfp (estimated) AMADEUS 0.59 0.65 -3.17 3.54 
Note: All variables except subsidiary, border and firm labor intensity are measured in natural logs. 
